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Abstract:  This paper contributes to the literature on economic efficiency, 
technical change, bioeconomic modeling, and renewable resource 
economics in general by introducing output-oriented Debreu-Farrell 
technical inefficiency and technical progress into normative static and 
dynamic bioeconomic models of a fishery and examines the economic 
and policy ramifications for the open-access Nash and sole-owner 
Pareto optimums. We consider output augmenting, exogenous and 
disembodied technical progress that directly affects the production 
technology, such as the adoption of electronics and subsequent 
learning by doing that facilitate the finding of fish. We examine a 
modified Golden Rule or fundamental equation of renewable resource 
economics. Introduction of technical inefficiency and technical progress 
into the static model allows for any number of steady-state equilibrium 
levels of fishing effort, resource stock, and yield for both the open 
access and sole owner optimums, each equilibrium conditional upon the 
state of technology and technical inefficiency. Introducing technical 
change and technical inefficiency into a dynamic model creates a 
modified Golden Rule in which there is no longer a steady-state 
equilibrium. Instead, the optimal level of the stock declines over time, 
because the unit profit increases due to technical progress. In contrast, 
in the absence of technical progress the standard Golden Rule shows 
that cost savings from a larger resource stock favor a larger stock that 
then remains stationary. Finally the paper discuss the policy 
implications.  
 